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IBE CONCEPT OF LAW REVISITED 
Leslie Green* 
THE CONCEPT OF LAW. Second Edition. By H.L.A. Hart. With a 
Postscript edited by Penelope A. Bulloch and Joseph Raz. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 1994. Pp. xii, 315. $26. 
Law is a social construction. It is a historically contingent fea-
ture of certain societies, one whose emergence is signaled by the 
rise of a systematic form of social control and elite domination. In 
one way it supersedes custom, in another it rests on it, for law is a 
system of primary social rules that direct and appraise behavior, 
together with secondary social rules that identify, change, and en-
force the primary rules. Law may be beneficial, but only in some 
contexts and always at a price, at the risk of grave injustice; our 
appropriate attitude to it is therefore one of caution rather than 
celebration. Law pretends, also, to an objectivity that it does not 
have, for whatever judges may say, they in fact wield serious polit-
ical power to create law. Not only is law therefore political, but so 
is legal theory - there can be no pure theory of law; concepts 
drawn from the law itself are inadequate to understand its nature. 
Legal theory is thus neither the sole preserve, nor even the natural 
habitat, of lawyers or law professors: it is just one part of a general 
social and political theory. We need such a theory, not to help de-
cide cases or defend clients, but to understand ourselves, our cul-
ture, and our institutions, and to promote serious moral assessment 
of those institutions, an assessment that must always take into ac-
count the conflicting realities of life. 
Those are the most important theses of the late H.L.A. Hart's 
The Concept of Law, published originally in 1961. Like some other 
great works of philosophy, however, Hart's book.is known as much 
by rumor as by reading, so it will be unsurprising if, to some, that 
does not sound like Hart at all. For what circulates as his views -
particularly, I am embarrassed to say, in law schools - is often 
quite different. Isn't Hart the dreary positivist who holds that law is 
a matter of rules that rest on a happy social consensus? Doesn't he 
think that law is objective, a matter of fact? Doesn't Hart celebrate 
the rule of law and take its rise as an achievement, a mark of pro-
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School and Department of Philosophy, York 
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gress from "primitive" to modem society? Doesn't Hart think that 
liberty and justice are possible only through the certainty that clear 
law provides? And isn't his whole theoretical perspective straight-
jacketed by a disproved, or at least outmoded, distinction between 
fact and value? Isn't Hart concerned more with semantics than 
politics? 
Between those conflicting readings of - maybe I should say 
"attitudes toward" - Hart's book, there also lies a realm of con-
sensus about the way The Concept of Law changed the direction of 
Anglo-American legal theory. For one thing, it introduced and 
clarified a set of questions that came to dominate the literature: Is 
law always coercive? What are legal rules? Do judges have discre-
tion? Is there a necessary connection between law and morality? 
Hart also coined the idiom in which we debate the answers to such 
questions: "the practice theory of rules," "the internal and the ex-
ternal point of view," "primary and secondary rules," "the rule of 
recognition," "core and penumbra," "content-independent rea-
sons," "social and critical morality." These terms and distinctions 
are now part of cultural literacy for legal theorists writing in 
English. 
How then can there be such a wide divergence in views about 
Hart's theory, such confusion about his central claims? It is impos-
sible to put it down to style. Hart is a clear and honest writer: 
every technical term is purchased in the coin of necessity; the occa-
sional obscurity of language is never a cover for shallowness of 
thought; humor and irony he uses to lighten, not conceal. In part, it 
may just be that the Zeitgeist has moved on. 
The Concept of Law is a book of its time. The book's language, 
examples, and method rest in England and, more specifically, Ox-
ford of the fifties.1 Here I want to try to bridge the gap not only, as 
I have done in the opening paragraph, by connecting Hart's con-
cerns with some more recent ones, but also by reexamining the 1961 
work in light of some themes in its newly published Postscript.2 
The second edition of The Concept of Law consists of the origi-
nal text together with a reply to critics that Hart left unfinished at 
the time of his death in 1992. The editors, Penelope Bulloch and 
Joseph Raz, have done an invaluable job of preparing this Post-
1. Contrary to what often is said, however, the book is not an exercise in linguistic philos-
ophy - though Hart was influenced by linguistic philosophy and, in his book with TONY 
HONORE, CAUSATION IN TiiE LAW (1959), demonstrated his facility with it. 
2. As Hart advised the student: 
In the case of any important jurist, it is frequently profitable to defer consideration of 
the question whether his statements about law are literally true or false, and to examine 
first, the detailed reasons given by him in support of his statements and, secondly, the 
conception or theory of law which his statement is designed to displace. 
P. 277. 
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script for publication. Two parts were projected by Hart. The first, 
published here, is mainly a reply to the criticisms of Ronald 
Dworkin. The second, which never got beyond fragmentary notes, 
sought to counter other critics - Raz among them, no doubt -
who, Hart concedes, found points of "incoherence and contradic-
tion" in his work (p. 239). Hart chose to add a postscript, rather 
than revise the text of the book, because, as the editors note, he 
"did not wish to tinker with the text whose influence has been so 
great."3 
It is not, of course, as if Hart waited thirty years to reply to his 
critics. He was a lively polemicist, and the points of refinement in 
this Postscript are less significant than a number of the essays he 
published after The Concept of Law. 4 The Postscript brings no ma-
jor surprises or recantations, and some of Hart's responses to 
Dworkin are already well-established in the literature: there is no 
categorical distinction to be drawn between legal rules and princi-
ples (pp. 260-63); principles can be comprehended in the rule of 
recognition (pp. 265-66); judges do exercise discretion, even when 
they carry forward by analogical construction the underlying spirit 
of the law, for at some point a choice among analogies cannot be 
avoided (p. 275); and positivist legal theory has never been a matter 
of semantics (pp. 245-47). Here, I want to focus on some other 
points, in particular some of Hart's last thoughts about rules, 
power, the connection between law and morality, and about the na-
ture of legal theory, for there we find some of the most enduring 
themes, and problems, of his work. 
I. LAW AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 
A. Antinaturalism and Antiessentialism 
Constructivism is now wildly popular in the social studies, where 
the term has expanded to refer to almost any antirealist, antiessen-
tialist, or antideterminist view of social life.5 Some of this argument 
is substantively idle, for it challenges no descriptive or normative 
thesis about its objects. If everything of interest is a social construe-
3. P. vii. It is too bad that the publisher did not share fully Hart's view, for the new 
edition of this widely cited classic has inexplicably been repaginated, so that the legal theo-
rist's professional tools are now a copy of the first edition, together with a photocopy of the 
new Postscript. 
4. Most of these are reprinted in his EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 
(1983). Attention also should be drawn to Natural Rights: Bentham and Mill, Legal Duty 
and Obligation, and Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, all in his EssA YS ON BEN-
TIIAM (1982); and to his brief Comment, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 
(R. Gavison ed., 1987). 
5. For some typical discussions see DIANA Fuss, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NA-
TURE AND DIFFERENCE (1989) or FORMS OF DESIRE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE SO-
CIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST CONTROVERSY (Edward Stein ed., 1990). 
1690 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:1687 
tion, if there is no unconstructed reality, then nothing follows from 
claiming that something is a social construction. Race is a social 
construction; and so are racism, poverty, and bullets. This might 
sound like a potent theory, but it is not. It is like being told that 
God does not exist, only to find out that the interlocutor does not 
believe in the existence of dogs either. Once we lose the terms of 
implied contrast and everything is on an ontological par, there is no 
critical bite to the claim. 
At a lesser level of generality, constructivism sometimes simply 
amounts to the thesis that the object in question has a history. 
Here, we need to distinguish the claim that our discourse about an 
object has a history from the claim that the object itself does. (That 
the word "electron" was invented in 1890 does not suffice to show 
that electrons were.) The significance of constructivism about our 
objects of inquiry depends on whether anyone might deny the latter 
thesis. It is trivial to speak of the social construction of intolerance, 
as it is undeniably obvious that tolerance and intolerance are mat-
ters of human thought and practice. It is more interesting to speak 
of the social construction of race, because many people still believe 
that the classification of people into races is a natural one, and con-
structivism challenges that belief. The most potent forms of con-
structivism are thus those that promise to surprise us with the news 
that a certain object of attention owes its very existence to social 
history.6 · 
Should we thrill to hear that law is a social construction? If that 
is just a consequence of the general thesis that everything is con-
structed, or that the word "law" is, then we more profitably may 
pass on to other business. If it is the claim that law is a phenome-
non with a history, then we will have at the very least a challenge to 
certain arguments that associate law with reason out of time, with 
what P.F. Strawson once called the core of human thought that has 
no history.7 Some forms of ancient and medieval natural law the-
ory might then be under threat. For example, no longer could we 
say, with Cicero, that 
[t]rue law is right reason in agreement with Nature; it is of universal 
application, unchanging and everlasting . . . . We cannot be freed 
6. Ian Hacking, one of the most sophisticated constructivists, puts it this way: 
I respect someone who can argue that quarks are socially constructed: this is a daring 
and provocative thesis that makes us think. I feel a certain guarded admiration when a 
fact whose discovery was rewarded with a Nobel Prize for medicine is described as the 
social construction of a scientific fact; anyone who shares my respect and admiration for 
fundamental science has to sit up take notice. I do not find it similarly thrilling to read 
about the social construction of events that could occur only historically, only in the 
context of a society. 
IAN H4CKING, REWRITING THE Sour.: MULTIPLE PERSONALITY AND SCIENCES OF MEMORY 
67 (1995) (footnotes omitted). 
7. See P.F. STRAWSON, INDIVIDUALS 10 (1959). 
May 1996] The Concept of Law 1691 
from its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside 
ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be 
different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in 
the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all 
nations and all times .... s 
But even if there exists such a timeless and universal natural moral 
law, practically everyone agrees that human law, our law, has a his-
tory, that it is a product of human thought and practice. Natural-
isms denying that are very much out of fashion among theorists -
though some judges have been known to flirt with them when they 
run out of arguments. 
Hart's theory places law firmly in history. According to him, 
that there is law at all follows wholly from the development of 
human society, a development that is intelligible to us, and the con-
tent of particular legal systems is a consequence of what people in 
history have said and done. Moreover, he maintains that even the 
normativity of law, its action-guiding and action-appraising charac-
ter, is a social construction to be understood as a function of peo-
ple's actions and their critical reactions to the behavior of others. 
For Hart, however, this is all part of the specific nature of law; it is 
not merely a consequence of some form of general philosophical 
nominalism. He theorizes law as a social construction, but it is one 
that emerges in a field of unconstructed reality including even cer-
tain unconstructed constraints of the human condition (p. 192). 
It is tempting to see Hart's constructivism simply as a reflection 
of his positivism; but that would be wrong, for one of the most so-
phisticated positivists, and one whose influence on Hart was signifi-
cant, denied parts of the constructivist thesis. Hans Kelsen held 
that law is a system of norms, which are not historical things at all.9 
Kelsen did think that jurisprudence should restrict its attention to 
positive law - human law rather than natural law - but he did not 
study law under its empirical aspects. Rather, he proposed to study 
it as a system of norms that, according to Kelsen, exists only if it is 
valid. "Validity," in tum, entails bindingness, in other words, that 
people ought to behave as the norms require. Historical facts -
such as the fact that someone said this, or ordered that, or was dis-
posed to behave thus - can never validate norms, for an "ought" 
cannot be derived from an "is." The reason for the validity of a 
norm can be only another norm, and thus the ultimate reason for 
the validity of law must be a norm rather than a matter of fact. This 
"transcendental-logical presupposition" Kelsen called the 
Grundnorm.10 So while Kelsen is a positivist - law may have any 
8. CICERO, DE RE PuBUCA III.xxii.33 (T.E. Page et al. eds. & Clinton Walker Keyes 
trans., 1928). 
9. See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 193-205 (Max Knight trans., 1967). 
10. See id. at 201. 
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content and there is no necessary connection between law and mo-
rality - he is not a social constructivist. For Kelsen, law-as-norms 
is not really part of the social realm at all, and the tools with which 
we study historically situated norms - sociology, psychology, polit-
ical theory, economics, etc. - are for him all "alien elements" that 
lead only to the "adulteration" of a pure theory of law.11 
For Hart, in contrast, law is a social construction in two senses of 
the term. First, law has a history. It is an institution that did not 
always exist, that emerged for special reasons, and that takes the 
form it does, including its normative character, only as a result of 
human action. In fact, law is a social construction of social con-
structions, not of brute facts but of institutional facts - namely, 
rules comprised by social practice and enforced by social pressure.12 
Second, Hart's resulting concept of law is antiessentialist: Though 
there are central cases of legal systems, and central features of 
those cases, there are also borderline cases and analogical cases 
when without impropriety we still may speak of law.13 For Hart, 
there is no essence to the phenomena we call "law" and, although 
legal theory is right to strive to understand law's central features, 
knowing these will not give us the key to all the sound generaliza-
tions about legal systems. There is no essence of law, the under-
standing of which can replace the hard historical, sociological, or, if 
you like, genealogical task of explaining law as a social phenome-
non. Thus, although the term would be foreign to him, there is no 
coherent way for a legal theory to be more constructivist than 
Hart's. 
B. Law and Social Rules 
One familiar hesitation about social constructivism and its at-
tendant suggestion of constructing or building a reality is that it 
sounds all too deliberate or voluntaristic. Gender is a social con-
struction, some even say a performance, yet people sometimes feel 
bullied and constrained by gender roles, and these roles often seem 
to resist revision. Giving adequate weight to both agency and struc-
ture, to the willed and the unwilled, was one of Hart's major tasks 
in replying to the classical positivists. 
11. See id. at 1. 
12. For a general account of the nesting of social facts, see JoHN SEARLE, THE CON· 
STRUCilON OF SOCIAL REALITY 79-126 (1995). 
13. Hart writes that: 
The uncritical belief that if a general tenn (e.g. "law," "state," "nation," "crime," 
"good," "just") is correctly used, then the range of instances to which it is applied must 
all share "common qualities" has been the source of much confusion. Much time and 
ingenuity has been wasted in jurisprudence in the vain attempt to discover, for the pur-
poses of definition, the common qualities which are, on this view, held to be the only 
respectable reason for using the same word of many different things .... 
P. 279. 
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Laws, said Thomas Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham, and John Austin, 
are expressions of will: they are the general commands of a sover-
eign.14 But as Hart saw, such a conception of law cannot explain 
the variety of forms of law, nor how sovereigns can be bound by 
their own rules, nor how law survives the death of the commander 
(pp. 26-78). Above all, it cannot explain the normative character of 
law, the fact that it purports to impose obligations on us (pp. 82-91). 
A person's say-so has such normative power only when that person 
somehow is authorized to make norms. Most sovereign bodies are, 
of course, legally authorized to make law, but we need to explain 
the laws authorizing the sovereign as much as any other law. So if 
there is a norm, or norms, at the root of the legal system, it cannot 
be a legal norm. Then what is it? Hart rejected Kelsen's theory of 
the unconstructed, unsocial Grundnorm and its mysteries.15 In-
stead, he argued that fundamental lawmaking power rests on a cus-
tomary social rule and has the kind of normative force that such 
rules have. Law, Hart argued, is a union of social rules: primary 
rules that guide behavior by imposing duties on people, and secon-
dary rules that provide for the identification, ,change, and enforce-
ment of the primary rules (pp. 90-99). Among the secondary rules, 
the so-called rule of recognition has special importance. A custom-
ary practice of those whose role it is to identify and apply primary 
rules, the rule of recognition provides ultimate criteria of legal va-
lidity by determining which acts create law. The rule of recognition 
itself is neither valid nor invalid; it simply exists as a matter of social 
fact or it does not. But when it does exist, and when people use it 
as a standard for appraising behavior, then the language of validity 
and invalidity comes to life, and a legal system is born. 
What are these social rules of which law is constructed? Hart's 
account, the "practice theory," holds that there is a rule among a 
group P, whenever there is a regularity R in their behavior such 
that: (1) most people in P conform to R; (2) lapses from con-
forming to R are criticized; (3) the criticism referred to in (2) is in 
turn regarded as justified; and ( 4) R is treated as a standard for the 
behavior of people in P. Rules are present when there is a certain 
kind of social practice, regular behavior together with the set of 
attitudes that Hart calls "acceptance" of the rule, which consists of 
using it as a standard for one's own behavior and that of others. 
Rules are to be identified and understood from the "internal point 
of view," .the point of view of one who uses the rules as a standard, 
14. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 311-35 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968); JEREMY 
BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970); JOHN AuSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF 
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Wilfred E. Rumble ed., 1995). 
15. For Hart's objections see pp. 292-93, and the essays Ke/sen Visited and Kelsen's Doc-
trine of the Unity of Law, in HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 
4. 
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though of course from the "external point of view" they merely ap-
pear as behavioral regularities (pp. 88-91). 
Whether we judge this account satisfactory depends on what we 
expect of it. What is a "theory of rules" anyway? Here are some 
things we might want to know about: What are rules? What is it to 
follow a rule? What does it mean to say that a rule "exists"? What 
is the relationship between rules and reasons for action? Hart's 
theory does not answer all of these questions, perhaps because his 
original ambitions were limited somewhat. He sought to distinguish 
rules from other regularities of behavior, in particular from habits 
and predictions; to explain, as a social matter, the binding force of 
rules; and to set out the existence conditions for social rules. His 
main dispute was with two forms of reductionism: the coercion-
based theories of classical positivism, which conceived of rules as 
orders backed by threats, and the behaviorist accounts influential 
among legal realists, which conceived of rules as predictions of offi-
cial action. Against these, Hart's arguments are decisive. So the 
practice theory may be judged as a set of existence conditions for 
social rules, as a test for the presence of rules, whether or not it 
offers an analysis of rules or a full account of what it is to follow a 
rule. A good set of existence conditions should tum up rules when 
practiced, and not otherwise, but it need not itself tell us everything, 
or even much, about the nature of rules any more than a litmus test 
for the presence of an acid will tell us much about what acids are. 
Hart's theory has, however, met with much criticism.16 There 
seem to be rules that are not social practices (e.g., individual rules); 
there are social practices that are not rules (e.g., certain common 
openings in chess that are not among the rules of chess); and citing 
a valid rule is often itself meant as a justification for one's behavior, 
not merely a sign that there is some other acceptable justification 
for it. The practice theory accommodates none of this. Moreover, 
matters of duty and obligation - which according to Hart amount 
to rules with a certain content17 that are enforced by serious social 
pressure - in some cases appear not to depend on rules at all. One 
certainly can believe that one has an obligation to save a drowning 
person without believing there is a social practice of doing this, nor 
even that there should be such a practice. 
Dworkin argued against Hart that some rules are a matter of 
concurrent practice when people converge for common reasons in-
dependent of their agreement, and that at best Hart's theory must 
16. See, e.g., RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 48-58 {1977); LESLIE 
GREEN, THE AUTIIORITY OF THE STATE 44-49 (1988); JosEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON 
AND NORMS 49-58 (1990). 
17. They are believed important and may conflict with immediate self-interest. See pp. 
86-87. 
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be restricted to conventional practices, when the fact of agreement 
in action is essential to the rule.1s So, for example, it is a merely 
conventional practice that in the United States people normally 
drive on the right because it is a sufficient reason for conformity 
that each expects everyone else to do the same. It is, however, a 
concurrent practice that people refrain from torturing others; they 
judge it wrong for reasons independent of what others are doing. 
We might add another distinction: there are also coincidental prac-
tices that are agreement independent, when people· do the same 
thing for different reasons. 
Dworkin attempted to confine the practice theory to conven-
tional rules and then argued that, even there, endemic controversy 
about the scope of rules shows that duties must have another foun-
dation. Conventional practice, he argued, never constitutes a nor-
matively binding rule; it is relevant only because of the way it 
expresses attitudes, gives rise to expectations, etc. that may figure in 
the justifications for such rules. Dworkin thought that he thus had 
proved that judicial duty cannot be limited to the scope of a prac-
tice rule. 
In the Postscript, Hart accepts Dworkin's distinction and now 
proposes to confine his theory to conventional rules only and to 
abandon the rule-based explanation of all duties. He maintains, 
however, that the practice theory gives a good account of conven-
tional rules, including the rule of recognition, "which is in effect a 
form of judicial customary rule existing only if it is accepted and 
practiced in the law-identifying and law-applying operations of the 
courts" (p. 256). There are no a priori limits, however, on the con-
tent of such a rule, and Hart suggests that Dworkin's holistic inter-
pretive theory might be understood as "merely the specific form 
taken in some legal systems by a conventional rule of recognition 
whose existence and authority depend on its acceptance by the 
courts" (p. 267). 
There are a number of difficulties here. For one, the distinction 
between conventional and concurrent reasons for conformity does 
not map onto a distinction between two kinds of rules, for both 
kinds of reasons may be present in one rule. Indeed, it is hard to 
think of practiced rules that have only concurrent reasons for con-
formity: even a prohibition on murder must, at the margins, draw 
certain conventional lines around the definition of murder. Hart 
says that a rule is conventional provided "the general conformity of 
a group to [it] is part of the reasons which its individual members 
have for acceptance" (p. 255). To be "part of" the reasons for ac-
ceptance is a weak condition that is satisfied by all the mixed cases. 
Indeed, in view of the fact that general conformity with law is a 
18. See DWORKIN, supra note 16, at 53-58. 
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public good, conventional reasons for conformity are normally 
present. For example, even people who think considerations of jus-
tice a very good reason for treating the requirements of the Internal 
Revenue Code as action-guiding typically conform their behavior to 
it only if they believe most other people will too. 
In these examples, concurrent reasons are present along with 
conventional ones. Sometimes Hart seems to have something else 
in mind. For example, .at one point he calls the rule of recognition 
"a mere conventional rule accepted by the judges and lawyers of 
particular legal systems" (p. 267). Is a rule a "mere" convention 
only if there are no concurrent reasons for compliance? It seems 
very unlikely that the rule of recognition is purely conventional; of-
ficials normally have moral views about the propriety of legislative 
power. Yet Hart says: 
Certainly the rule of recognition is treated in my book as resting on a 
conventional form of judicial consensus. That it does so rest seems 
quite clear at least in English and American law for surely an English 
judge's reason for treating Parliament's legislation (or an American 
judge's reason for treating the Constitution) as a source of law having 
supremacy over other sources includes the fact that his judicial col-
leagues concur in this as their predecessors have done. [pp. 266-67] 
Judicial recognition may, however, include that fact as a necessary 
but insufficient condition, such that each judge recognizes the Con-
stitution as supreme law only because other judges do too and also 
because she for her part thinks that the Constitution is just. Hart 
would say that this is possible, but not necessary, for acceptance of 
a conventional rule can rest on anything whatever. He therefore 
rejects not only Dworkin's claim that there must be good moral 
grounds for doing what the rule says, but even the weaker thesis 
that people must believe, rightly or wrongly, that there are good 
moral grounds for doing what it says. 
In the case of purely conventional rules, what motivates con-
formity? Despite Hart's suggestion that it may be anything 
whatever, I think that it must rest on something like an overlapping 
mutual interest19 and that the content of convention, contrary to 
Dworkin, fulfills not a justificatory function, but the identificatory 
function of showing which of the possible ways of conforming is the 
one that will be practiced and thus serve that interest. People typi-
cally do, of course, have preferences among alternative common 
ways of acting. They do not regard them all as equivalent and the 
differences among them are often important; but if the rule is to be 
purely conventional, then at some point these differences must 
overwhelm the divergence of.interest. The worry, however, is that 
when we come to fill out the idea of a mutual interest in conformity 
19. See my Authority and Convention, 35 PHIL. Q. 329 (1985). 
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we may end up without an obligation-imposing rule. It is odd to 
think, for instance, that there is an obligation to eat with one's knife 
in the right hand, even when it is conventional to do' so. In reducing 
the rule of recognition to a purely conventional rule, Hart ends up 
without an adequate account of its binding force, not even one con-
sistent with his own theory of social obligation. 
None of this has anything to do with any indeterminacy or con-
troversiality of conventions; the problem arises even when they are 
quite clear. In fact, as Hart says, indeterminacy and controversiality 
are side issues. The idea that controversiality of some legal deci-
sions disproves the existence of a generally accepted rule of 
recognition 
rests on a misunderstanding of the function of the rule. It assumes 
that the rule is meant to determine completely the legal result in par-
ticular cases, so that any legal issue arising in any case could simply be 
solved by mere appeal to the criteria or tests provided by the rule. 
But this is a misconception: the function of the rule is to determine 
only the general conditions which correct legal decisions must satisfy 
in modem systems of law. [p. 258] 
That is right, though it is put somewhat loosely, for whether a legal 
decision is "correct" will depend on a great many things: whether 
the judge can read English, follow logic, reason morally, and so 
forth. The rule of recognition, at least as originally conceived by 
Hart, did not purport to set any such conditions, generally or other-
wise. It purported only to identify which of various social standards 
are legally relevant - which are sources of law. Because these are 
sources that judges are legally bound to apply, however, any analy-
sis of the fundamental rules of a legal system still must be consistent 
with their obligatory force. Unlike Kelsen and Dworkin, who are 
on this point in agreement against him, Hart· is a social constructiv-
ist about obligation itself. But his view that the fundamental rules 
are "mere conventions" continues to sit uneasily with· any notion of 
obligation. · · 
II. CONSENSUS, DOMINATION, AND POWER 
So law, for Hart, is socially constructed from rules, which are 
themselves constructed from individual practice. That may sound, 
to some, like a rather complacent and comfortable view of an insti-
tution that is an instrument of social control, for accepted social 
rules are the sort of things that we ordinarily find in the discredited 
"consensus" theories of the social functionalists and systems theo-
rists. What about conflict and power? 
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A. Hart's Whig History 
It is unfortunate that Hart introduces his concept of law through 
a somewhat wooden, fictional history of social development, track-
ing the change from what he sometimes calls a "primitive" form of 
community based solely on rules of obligation to a different form of 
social organization based on primary and secondary rules (pp. 91-
99). It is perhaps these passages more than any others that have 
contributed to his undeserved reputation as an enthusiast of the 
rule of law, for on a casual reading it seems like a Whig history of 
progress, from primitive to modern, from custom to law. On this 
reading, we begin with a primitive society in which social order rests 
on a broad consensus about the so-called primary rules of obliga-
tion that are maintained by diffuse social pressure. But these socie-
ties are static, inefficient, and fraught with uncertainty. Law 
emerges to - maybe even emerges in order to - cure these de-
fects. Thus in a "developed," "complex" society things are better. 
We gain certainty, dynamism, and efficiency through the introduc-
tion of rules of recognition, change, and adjudication. That is a 
common reading, but it is mistaken, and the mistake easily can cor-
rode one's understanding of Hart's theory. So let us take it more 
slowly. 
For Hart "primitive" here just means simple. The reason that 
such societies do not have law is that they do not need it: nothing in 
human nature or society requires that we have law; many people 
have gotten along well without it (p. 91 ). A legal system, with its 
institutionalized means of social control, is "not a necessity, but a 
luxury" (p. 235). What then does Hart mean when he speaks of the 
"defects" that the secondary rules cure? It is crucial to his argu-
ment that simpler forms of social order do work, but only in certain 
contexts. He writes: "only a small community closely knit by ties 
of kinship, common sentiment, and belief, and placed in a stable 
environment, could live successfully by such a regime of unofficial 
rules" (p. 92). Despite this real viability, "[i]n any other conditions 
such a simple form of social control must prove defective and will 
require supplementation in different ways" (p. 92; emphasis added). 
It follows, then, that the "defects" that law "remedies" are not de-
fects in simple, transparent forms of social order. They are, in a 
sense, defects in us. These problems arise when we try to apply 
those informal solutions native to a world of transparent solidarity 
to our world, a world of few or repudiated kinship ties, in which 
sentiments are not shared, in which the environment is a maelstrom 
of change, where, as Marx says, "all that is solid melts into air."20 
So Hart's targets here are not simple, transparent forms of social 
20. KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (1872), 
reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 476 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978). For a 
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order. It is the mistaken drive to apply techniques of governance 
appropriate to those targets to a more opaque world of strangers -
the mistake of a Rousseau or of some modern communitarian polit-
ical theory. It is also the mistake, I think, of Dworkin when he 
suggests that political obligation may rest on fraternal "obligations 
of community."21 
It needs to be said, however, that Hart's discussion in these 
pages is not exactly paralyzed with rigor. As many commentators 
have noticed,22 his classification of rules as primary and secondary 
is deployed here in a number of inconsistent ways: to mark a dis-
tinction of social importance (necessary vs. optional), of genesis 
(first vs. later), of normative type (duty-imposing vs. power-confer-
ring), and of object (rules about behavior vs. rules about rules). 
These distinctions are neither the same nor extensionally equivalent 
- they will carve up the territory in different ways. Moreover, it 
seems unlikely there have existed societies that had rules of obliga-
tion, yet had no ways to create, extinguish, or vary such obligations. 
Hart focuses on a simple regime that regulates "free use of vio-
lence, theft, and deception" (p. 91), but surely the human condition 
also requires that any society find some way to regulate property 
and kinship. That suggests that well before the emergence of the 
systematizing rules of a legal order secondary rules in some of 
Hart's senses already would have existed. 
We can remedy this defect easily enough, and when we do so 
Hart's theory clearly carries no significant bias in favor of modern 
legal orders. Paradoxically, the bias more often lies with those who 
detect in Hart's argument a form of modernist triumphalism, for 
plainly what irks them about Hart's story is the thought that, if a 
society lacks a legal system, then it lacks one of the achievements of 
modernity - that it is uncivilized. Because it would be parochial 
and demeaning to think "primitive" societies uncivilized, by modus 
tollens, they must have legal systems. Hart's account, in failing to 
acknowledge these as legal systems, therefore improperly must 
favor modem or Western law. The logical form of this argument is 
a bit startling, as it attempts to deduce an "is" from an "ought," but 
quite apart from that it simply relies on a premise that Hart strenu-
ously rejects: Law is not a mark of civility or justice, or anything of 
the kind; it is just one way in which a complex society copes when 
brilliant discussion of this theme, see MARSHALL BERMAN, ALL THAT Is Soun MELTS INTO 
AIR (1982). 
21. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 190-216 (1986). I have criticized Dworkin's 
attempt to derive the duty to obey the law from communal obligations in Associate Obliga-
tions and the State, in LAW AND THE COMMUNITY: THE ENO OF INDIVIDUALISM? 93-118 (A. 
Hutchinson & L. Green eds., 1989). 
22. See, e.g., C.F.H. Tapper, Powers and Secondary Rules of Change, in OXFORD EssA YS 
IN JURISPRUDENCE, 2d ser. 242-77 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973). 
1700 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:1687 
the direct, transparent form of social order no longer works very 
well. 
B. Elite Domination 
Hart argues against John Austin, who had a top-down, pyrami-
dal view of law as the orders of a sovereign generally obeyed and 
backed up by threats.23 It commonly is acknowledged that Austin's 
was a crude theory, but some feel that it was at least realistic and 
that Hart, while making positivism more subtle, also loses its punch. 
For now law must rest, ultimately, on a form of social consensus, 
and that idea obscures the ways in which law in fact is rooted in 
social power. 
Perhaps the most misunderstood part of Hart's view is the way 
in which law is, and is not, related to social consensus. Dworkin 
persistently has maintained, for example, that Hart cannot properly 
explain the depth and nature of controversy about law .24 For Hart, 
law may be controversial because it is a matter of open-textured 
social rules that, though they have a "core" of settled meaning, also 
have "penumbra!" areas of doubt in which the applicability of the 
rule is, as a matter of practice, indeterminate (pp. 124-54). This is 
as true of the rule of recognition as it is of any rule identified by it. 
It too has a penumbra! area of discretionary judgment, unregulated 
by law, but where decisions still may be appraised as better and 
worse by other relevant standards, including those of critical 
morality. 
How much consensus does law in fact require? Many people 
would accept something like Dworkin's precis of Hart's theory: 
[T]he true grounds of law lie in the acceptance by the community as a 
whole of a fundamental master rule (he calls this a "rule of recogni-
tion") .... For Austin the proposition that the speed limit in Califor-
nia is 55 is true just because the legislators who enacted that rule 
happen to be in control there; for Hart it is true because the people of 
California have accepted, and continue to accept, the scheme of au-
thority in the state and national constitutions.25 
The problem with that as a theory is obvious enough. First, it is 
a fantasy: many people in California have no idea what the 
"scheme of authority in the state and national constitutions" 
amounts to. Some are not even aware that there is a state constitu-
tion, so the sense in which the community "accepts" it is pretty at-
tenuated. Second, and worse, the "people of California" is an 
abstraction, or a legal concept itself: the irrelevance of the attitudes 
of those living in Tijuana is something that needs to be explained, 
23. See AUSTIN, supra note 14. 
24. See DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 3-11, 37-43; DWORKIN, supra note 16, at 31-45. 
25. DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 34. 
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not assumed, by a theory of law. Beyond these two problems with 
the theory suggested in that passage, however, there is also some-
thing wrong with it as an exposition of Hart, something worse than 
mere imprecision. 
Hart knew that the United Kingdom, for example, has power to 
make law for Northern Ireland. He also understood that it would 
be wrong to characterize this as a situation in which that latter com-
munity accepts the scheme of constitutional authority, for it is noto-
rious that a large minority in Northern Ireland neither accepts, nor 
acquiesces in, that authority. Indeed, if we take the notion of ac-
ceptance at all seriously it must be the case that general acceptance 
of law's authority is pretty rare. Yet far from being an objection to 
Hart's theory, this is an entailment of it. 
The idea that the social foundations of law rest on "acceptance 
by the community as a whole of a fundamental master rule" seri-
ously distorts Hart's view. According to Hart, a regime of general 
social consensus is what precedes a legal regime. Law has .a com-
plex relation to conventional, customary rules, partly recognizing 
them, partly replacing them. The existence of the rule of recogni-
tion explains why there is law in California, in Northern Ireland, or 
in Quebec - a functioning legal system even though there is in 
those jurisdictions no broad social consensus on the overall scheme 
of authority. Hart writes: 
In the simpler structure, since there are no officials, the rules must be 
widely accepted as setting critical standards for the behavior of the 
group. If, there, the internal point of view is not widely disseminated 
there could not logically be any rules. But where there is a union of 
primary and secondary rules, which is, as we have argued, the most 
fruitful way of regarding a legal system, the acceptance of rules as 
common standards for the group may be split off from the relatively 
passive matter of the ordinary individual acquiescing in the rules by 
obeying them for his part alone. In an extreme case the internal point 
of view with its characteristic normative use of legal language ('This is 
a valid rule') might be confined to the official world. In this more 
complex system, only officials might accept and use the system's crite-
ria of legal validity. The society in which this was so might be deplor-
ably sheeplike; the sheep might end in the slaughter-house. But there 
is little reason for thinking that it could not exist or for denying it the 
title of a legal system. [p. 117; emphasis added] 
This passage illuminates one of the central ways that power rela-
tions emerge with law. Both social morality and custom, Hart 
notes, are immune to deliberate change; they evolve only gradually 
(p. 175). We almost might say that the emergence of law signals 
that a society has acquired a new capacity deliberately to control its 
common life, that, in a certain way, the community has come to 
self-consciousness. Customs and norms now can be changed forth-
with, by the say-so of the rulers, by majority vote, or whatever. The 
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crucial fact is therefore institutionalization: the emergence of spe-
cialized organs with power to identify, alter, and enforce the social 
rules. This "advance," however, brings both gains and costs: "[t]he 
gains are those of adaptability to change, certainty, and efficiency, 
and these are immense; the cost is the risk that the centrally organ-
ized power may well be used for the oppression of numbers with 
whose support it can dispense, in a way that the simpler regime of 
primary rules could not" (p. 202). These risks are real and some-
times have materialized. So, for Hart, the only consensus necessary 
for law is a consensus of elites; that is a direct and potent conse-
quence of the fact that law is an institutionalized normative system. 
C. Coercion and Power 
While the institutionalization of law creates elites who may 
come to dominate society, Hart also argues that law is not, of its 
nature, coercive, at least not in the sense that all laws somehow 
amount to coercive threats. Hart denies that it is possible to reduce 
all power-conferring rules to sanction-prescribing rules (pp. 26-49). 
One relatively unsophisticated form of such reductionism goes like 
this: Rules empowering people to do things - e.g., to legislate, to 
contract, to make wills, to marry, to amend a constitution - specify 
ways in which these things must be done in order for the power to 
be exercised validly. Failure to conform in the relevant ways means 
that the purported exercise of power fails: the action in question is 
a mere nullity; it lacks the legal effect it purports to have. But is 
this nullity not essentially the same as the sanctions imposed by 
criminal law? After all, nullity can be as inconvenient, distressing, 
and expensive as some penalties. 
Hart decisively campaigns against such reasoning (pp. 34-35). 
First, the undesirability of nullity is purely contingent; it may some-
times be a benefit to find that, for example, a certain contract is 
void. Second, and more important, the reductionist account falsi-
fies the nature of power-conferring rules. In the case of a duty-
imposing rule we can distinguish two different elements: the re-
quired standard of behavior (e.g., refrain from assault) and the rein-
forcing sanction (e.g., or else pay a fine or go to jail). These 
elements, however, are not similarly present in the case of a power-
conferring rule. For example, promises that are neither under seal 
nor given for consideration are not something to be abstained from. 
In so defining contractual powers, the law does not have it in mind 
that people should either make . valid contracts or refrain from 
promising. The provision failure to comply with which results in 
nullity is not a separable part of the rule; it constitutes the rule it-
self. To the Kelsenian suggestion that they are fragments of rules 
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that direct the courts to apply sanctions, Hart replies that this too 
distorts the way law really works: 
It is of course very important, if we are to understand the law, to see 
how the courts administer it when they come to apply its sanctions. 
But this should not lead us to think that all there is to understand is 
what happens in courts. The principal functions of the law as a means 
of social control are not to be seen in private litigation or prosecu-
tions, which represent vital but still ancillary provisions for the fail-
ures of the system. It is to be seen in the diverse ways in which the 
law is used to control, to guide, and to plan life out of court. [p. 40] 
This passage nicely illustrates Hart's contextual approach to 
legal theory. There is no metaphysical answer to the question of 
the individuation of laws. To understand the law is just to explicate 
how power-conferring rules are used by those who use them: "Such 
power-conferring rules are thought of, spoken of, and used in social 
life differently from rules which impose duties, and they are valued 
for different reasons. What other tests for difference in character 
could there be?" (p. 41). 
Those are certainly relevant considerations. But not only are 
power-conferring rules valued for special reasons, sometimes they 
also are feared and resented for special reasons. For Austin and 
Kelsen, reductionism springs from the assumption that to have a 
duty or obligation is to be subject, directly or indirectly, to coercion. 
The salience of coercion in their theories is underwritten by the sig-
nificance it plays in our lives: we normally seek to avoid it. To this, 
Hart replies that coercion is real but secondary (pp. 199-200). First, 
it is needed only when law fails in its primary task of giving stan-
dards for guiding and appraising behavior. Second, it is conceivable 
that a legal system might not need coercive sanctions at all; their 
presence in all actual, legal systems results not from the nature of 
law but from the exigencies of human nature. 
There is, I think, yet another reason for attending to the coer-
cive character of law: it is the most dramatic way in which law exer-
cises power over people. Some, though not all, laws are coercive; 
but many more laws, though not coercive, are forms of social 
power. That is true even of those power-conferring rules that Hart 
generally refers to in a positive-sounding way as providing "facili-
ties." Consider, for instance, the legal power to marry. It is granted 
subject to conditions that, even in so-called liberal regimes, nor-
mally include the requirement that the union be concluded between 
people of different sexes. Same-sex marriages are legal nullities. 
Now, it would, for the sort of reasons Hart gives, be misguided to 
think that what is going on here is a direct or indirect form of coer-
cion, that people are being forced into the paradigmatic heterosex-
ual union. There is, after all, no requirement to marry and, a 
fortiori, no requirement to marry one of the opposite sex. In most 
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jurisdictions it is not even wrong to purport to marry someone of 
one's own sex, and no punishment is given one who purports to 
conduct such a marriage; yet such marriages are null. There is, I 
think, something important here, and one who fails to notice the 
specific ways in which the legal system at this point embodies and 
exercises power fails to notice something specific about legal regu-
lation. Heterosexist marriage laws exercise power in different ways 
from, say, criminal prohibitions on sodomy. The latter attempt to 
guide people's behavior by removing options or rendering them in-
feasible. The marriage laws do not do that. While they do not re-
move anyone's options, they do give options to some and withhold 
them from others, and they do so in circumstances in which many 
other legal and social consequences follow in train. 
That law is in such ways deeply involved in social power will 
come as a surprise to few. Marxists, critical legal scholars, and fem-
inists all have noticed it; Foucauldians revel in it. Few, however, 
have given enough thought to the ways in which the specific charac-
ter of law contributes to its power.26 It is not enough to remind us 
of the facts of class, hierarchy, patriarchy, or disciplinary regimes. 
We also need to know how these express themselves through the 
different forms of law and how the legalization of, for instance, 
power-conferring rules affects the power distribution in society. 
Many other examples exist: laws create classifications, declare sta-
tuses, etc. True, these cannot be reduced to the coin of coercion, 
but one of the reasons for worrying about coercion, that it is a form 
of power, extends also to cases when power is exercised 
noncoercively. Thus classification systems and so forth may be pro-
ductive uses of power: they create subjects, kinds of people, who 
then can be regulated in other ways. Of course, the informal social 
order does this too, but when productive power becomes imbued 
with the authority of law it raises the stakes enormously. 
Hart's view about law and power was not at all rosy. He wrote: 
"So long as human beings can gain sufficient cooperation from 
some to enable them to dominate others, they will use the forms of 
law as one of their instruments" (p. 210). But the way the forms of 
law interact with social power, both repressively and productively, 
is something on which we need a good deal more work. 
26. Among the Marxists, only Pashukanis clearly saw that we need an account of law's 
specificity as a means of social control. 
If ... we forgo an analysis of the fundamental juridical concepts, all we get is a theory 
which explains the emergence of legal regulation from the material needs of society, and 
thus provides an explanation of the fact that legal norms conform to the material inter-
ests of particular social classes. Yet legal regulation itself has still not been analyzed as a 
form .... 
EvoENY B. PASHUKANis, LAW AND MARXISM: A GENERAL THEORY 55 (C. Arthur ed. & B. 
Einhorn trans., 1978). 
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III. LAW AND MORALITY 
A. Soft Positivism 
1705 
One important point of clarification in the Postscript is that Hart 
now explicitly says that he is a "soft positivist":27 he thinks that 
while there may be some legal systems in which the fundamental 
test for law is wholly a matter of social fact, there are others in 
which it requires moral judgment (p. 250). He only denies that 
moral judgments are always required to. know the law .. That, of 
course, is to deny Dworkin's central thesis, that the law is whatever 
is entailed by the moral and political theory that both fits and best 
justifies the legal institutions in question.28 
In response to Dworkin's objections to the claim that the rule of 
recognition is a matter of "pedigree,"29 Hart says that he never in-
tended to limit its content in this way, that it may go beyond the 
mode of creation or adoption of rules and include also among its 
criteria both matters of fact not properly thought of as pedigree 
(e.g., the substantive constraints of the Sixteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution) and matters not of fact but of moral value 
(p. 250). Indeed, he says that this was always his view, and refers 
the reader both to the text of The Concept of Law and to an earlier 
article in which he claims to "state ... that in some systems of law, 
as in the United States, the ultimate criteria of legal validity might 
explicitly incorporate besides pedigree, principles of justice or sub-
stantive moral values, and these may form the content of legal con-
stitutional constraints" (p. 247). Acceptance by the courts and its 
reflection in practice is always a necessary element of the rule of 
recognition, but what they accept may include moral principles. 
The passage that Hart cites in defense of this interpretation of 
his earlier work is, however, a reply to the Austinian view that a 
supreme lawmaking authority necessarily must be absolute, that it 
can make and unmake any law whatever, and that thus there is al-
ways an unlimited sovereign behind a legally limited legislature. 
Hart draws his important distinction between the presence of an 
enforceable duty not to legislate in a certain way - arguably incon-
sistent with supreme authority - and the absence of a legal power 
to legislate in a certain way. Yet this refei::ence is somewhat puz-
zling if it is supposed to demonstrate Hart's allegiance to soft posi-
tivism. On Austin's theory, the sovereign is not to ~e identified 
27. The best and most extensive defense of soft positivism is W.J. WALUCHOW, INCLU-
SIVE LEGAL PosrrrV!sM (1994). Earlier discussions include Jules Coleman, Negative and Pos-
itive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982); David Lyons, Moral Aspects of Legal Theory, 
7 MIDWEST STUD. IN PmL. 223 (1982); Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a 
Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, 15 MICH. L. REV. 473 (1977). 
28. See DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 87-101. 
29. See DWORKIN, supra note 16, at 17. 
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with the legislature but with whatever body enjoys habitual obedi-
ence while not rendering similar obedience to anyone else. Simi-
larly, on Hart's theory the rule of recognition is not to be identified 
with the constitution but with the practices of recognition that are 
expressed when the constitution is applied. For whether a written 
constitution is a source of law is also a question for whose answer 
we must turn to the rule of recognition. 
Hart describes the rule of recognition as a conventional judicial 
rule that identifies certain things as sources of law. But Hart's own 
analysis of cases in which a statute is certified as law by the rule of 
recognition in fact does not suggest that everything that is required 
for a proper application of the statute counts as law. He considers a 
case in which the legislature requires an industry to charge only a 
"fair rate" for its services (pp. 131-32). Although there will be some 
extreme cases of unfairness that clearly are proscribed by the legis-
lation, there will be many more debatable cases that it would be 
both impossible and unwise to try to specify in advance. Hart says: 
The anticipatable combinations of relevant factors are few, and this 
entails a relative indeterminacy in our initial aim of a fair rate ... and 
a need for further official choice. In these cases it is clear that the 
rule-making authority must exercise a discretion, and there is no pos-
sibility of treating the question raised by the various cases as if there 
were one uniquely correct answer to be found, as distinct from an 
answer which is a reasonable compromise between many conflicting 
interests. [pp. 131-32] 
Law therefore always must strike some compromise between the 
two aims of settling things clearly in advance and leaving room for 
later choices in view of the relevant values and contextual facts. 
Indeterminacy in law is thus not only an ineliminable feature of lan-
guage, it is also a desirable element of flexibility. 
It is interesting to compare this view about statutory interpreta-
tion with what Hart says, above, about constitutions. Hart's analy-
sis is that when a statute leaves it open to an adjudicator to 
determine what is "fair," "safe," "reasonable," and so on, it confers 
a certain discretion - a choice undetermined by law but open to 
reasoned justification. Yet in his new analysis of constitutional pro-
visions referring to "due process" and "freedom of speech," among 
others, he imputes the chosen interpretation of those values back 
into the law itself, rather than, as his statutory case might suggest, to 
the discretionary power of the court. This is Hart's soft positivism. 
In reality, the text of The Concept of Law is indecisive as be-
tween soft positivism and any harder version. It is understandable 
why Hart felt the urge to find in his book precedent for the views 
about law and morality that he seemed to hold when he wrote its 
Postscript. The fact of the matter, however, is that the distinction 
between stronger and weaker versions of the positivist thesis was 
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unknown when he wrote the book and was therefore not part of the 
polemical context of the time. Properly concerned about the natu-
ral lawyers on his right flank, Hart did not anticipate the forces also 
gathering on his left. 
The resultant ambiguity means that those who endorse stronger 
versions of the positivist thesis also can find mucP. of what they 
want in The Concept of Law. Resisting Hart's last suggestion, they 
can draw from his original text some of the main elements neces-
sary to a unified view of the examples of statutory and constitu-
tional interpretation discussed above. For example, in discussing 
the idea of the "sources" of law, Hart comments as follows on the 
somewhat blurry distinction between the formal or legal sources of 
law, the reason why something counts as valid law, and its material 
or historical sources, the cause of its existence: 
Where [a judge] considers that no statute or other formal source of 
law determines the case before him, he may base his decision on e.g. a 
text of the Digest, or the writings of a French jurist. . . . The legal 
system does not require him to use these sources, but it is accepted as 
perfectly proper that he should do so. They are therefore more than 
merely historical or causal influences since such writings are recog-
nized as "good reasons" for decisions. Perhaps we might speak of 
such sources as "permissive" legal sources to distinguish them both 
from "mandatory" legal or formal sources such as statute and from 
historical or material sources. [p. 294] 
This suggests that, on Hart's account, something may be a good and 
proper reason for a judicial decision in an unregulated case - it 
even may be recognized by the courts as such - and yet not be the 
law precisely because it is not mandated by a binding source. Here, 
of course, Hart presents such a reason as a different "kind" of 
source: a "permissive" one. But all we need for a unified account is 
the idea that there may be mandatory and permissive aspects to a 
single source, and that the law ends where mandatory direction 
runs out. And that would give us strong positivism. 
Hart's resistance to this, and his attraction to soft positivism, 
may, I think, result from embracing a false dilemma: either there is 
some kind of logical incoherence in the idea that a rule of recogni-
tion could specify moral tests for law, or there is not. If not, then 
the most we can say is that such tests would be undesirable. In-
deed, this sort of argument pervades Hart's defense of a broad con-
cept of law that includes immoral laws and legal systems over a 
narrow one that does not. He argues forcefully that we may and 
should distinguish between thinking, for example, that certain legal 
systems are wicked, and thinking that they are not legal systems at 
all (pp. 207-12). It is conceivable, though profoundly undesirable, 
that a legal system might ignore procedural and substantive justice. 
The other side of this coin is that it is conceivable, though in a dif-
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ferent way also undesirable, that a legal system might provide wide-
ranging tests of moral rectitude for the validity of law. That ap-
pears to be the burden of the following passage: 
There is, for me, no logical restriction on the content of the rule of 
recognition: so far as "logic" goes it could provide explicitly or im-
plicitly that the criteria determining validity of subordinate laws 
should cease to be regarded as such if the laws identified in accord-
ance with them proved to be morally objectionable. So a constitution 
could include in its restrictions on the legislative power even of its 
supreme legislature not only conformity with due process but a com-
pletely general provision that its legal power should lapse if its enact-
ments ever conflicted with principles of morality and justice. The 
objection to this extraordinary arrangement would not be "logic" but 
the gross indeterminacy of such criteria of legal validity. Constitu-
tions do not invite trouble by taking this form.30 
' Since this arrangement is, indeed, not prohibited by "logic," it 
may seem that the only important questions are which indetermina-
cies cause trouble, and how much trouble we can tolerate. Dworkin 
complains that if we allow the rule of recognition to be anything 
other than a "more or less mechanical test" based on "matters of 
social history rather than matters of policy or morality that might be 
inherently controversial," then it cannot do what Hart says it does 
- namely, cure the uncertainty of a pre-legal, customary regime,31 
In reply, Hart says that Dworkin "seems to ... exaggerate both the 
degree of certainty which a consistent positivist must attribute to a 
body of legal standards and the uncertainty that will result if the 
criteria of legal validity include conformity with specific moral prin-
ciples or values" (p. 251). In any case, he continues, "the exclusion 
of all uncertainty at whatever costs in other values is not a goal 
which I have ever envisaged for the rule of recognition" (p. 251). 
These disputes about whether too much indeterminacy would 
flow from a rule of recognition that comprised moral principles are, 
however, beside the point. Some moral judgments are more cer-
tain, and are subject to broader agreement, than some factual ones. 
For instance, it may be more certain that it is wrong to torture inno-
cent children for one's own amusement than it is that a legislature 
intended to promote the welfare of children by enacting a certain 
statute. The central question, and one that Hart never addresses 
here, is whether there might be constraints on a rule of recognition 
that are given neither by "logic," that is, by what is conceivable, nor 
by what is the most efficient mix of certainty and flexibility. 
Consider, for example, the kind of authority that legal rules pur-
port to have. In one of Hart's later papers, he characterizes this as 
30. HART, EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 4, at 361. 
31. Ronald Dworkin, Reply, in RONALD DwoRKIN AND CONTEMPORARY JurusPRU· 
DENCE 247, 247-48 {Marshall Cohen ed., 1983). 
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a claim to provide reasons for acting that are both peremptory -
that set aside the subject's own assessment of the merits of what is 
to be done - and "content-independent" - "intended to function 
as a reason independently of the nature or character of the actions 
to be done."32 This is not a point of logic. There is nothing in the 
meaning of the word "authority," nothing in its logical grammar, 
and nothing in the requirements of reason itself to show that legal 
authority is understood best in the way Hart suggests. That is a 
matter of legal and political theory, not logic. And, even if we 
come, as I think we should, to endorse his view of authority, noth-
ing will follow as a matter of sheer logic about the rule of recogni-
tion. The motivation for endorsing that view, however, and most 
plausible accounts of why content-independent reasons find a place 
in practical thought, nonetheless may sit uneasily with the idea that 
the rule of recognition can make content-dependent considerations 
of morality - the force of which depends precisely on that nature 
or character of the actions to be done - part of the law. Indeed, 
this is the core of Raz's argument against soft positivism.33 It may 
be that those two theses can be reconciled somehow, or that one or 
the other should be abandoned. But Hart does neither, and that 
leaves his final commitment to soft positivism unstable. 
B. Antifunctionalism 
Inclusion in the ultimate criteria of legal validity is not the only 
way that morality could have a necessary connection to law. An-
other argument, at least as popular, rests on the purported social 
function of law. Lon Fuller, for instance, said that the function Qf 
law is to guide human conduct, which it can do only by conforming 
to certain procedural principles that he called the "inner morality" 
of law.34 Dworkin says that the function of law is to justify the use 
of coercion, and thus it must have the features necessary to do 
that.35 John Finnis says that the function of law is to coordinate 
action for the common good.36 Roger Shiner says that "the judge-
ment of some system of norms that it is a legal system is at one and 
the same time a candidate judgement of critical morality that the 
system fulfills well some moral purpose."37 Michael Moore says: 
"If law is a functional kind then necessarily law serves some good 
32. H.L.A. Hart, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in EssA vs ON BENTHAM, 
supra note 4, at 243, 254. 
33. See JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 45-52 (1979); Joseph Raz, Authority, Law 
and Morality, 68 MoN1sr 295 (1985). The argument receives criticism from a soft-positivist 
point of view in WALUCHOW, supra note 27, at 117-40. 
34. See LoN FuLI.ER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1969). 
35. See DwoRKIN, supra note 21, at 93. 
36. See JoHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). 
37. ROGER SHINER, NORM AND NATURE 129 (1992). 
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and thus, necessarily, law is in that way related to morality."38 In 
their different ways, each of these writers finds in functionalism a 
link between law and morality. 
Hart, while allowing that existing legal systems share a "mini-
mum content" based on what is needed to help secure human sur-
vival (pp. 193-200), did not accept any further teleological claims 
about law's inherent value. First, as he pointed out in his contro-
versy with Fuller, the functional sense of good, as in a "good screw-
driver" is not the same as the moral sense, as in "good person." 
Any purposive and rule-governed human practice has certain goods 
internal to that practice,39 and this gives rise to a certain objectivity 
of language about practice-goods. It follows that just as there may 
be an internal morality of law in Fuller's sense, there also may be an 
internal morality of murder according to which a good murder is 
one that scores high on the functional-excellence scale of murder. 
There is no shortage of nonmoral functions of law, from fairly neu-
tral (e.g., guiding behavior) to most troublesome (e.g., elite domina-
tion). These functions all may have their internal "moralities," but 
none of them establishes a necessary connection between law and 
moral value. 
Second, even if law has social functions that are deemed, at least 
prima facie, morally good (e.g., maintaining order, making justice 
possible, etc.), there is but an oblique connection between that and 
the claim that a particular legal system has those values. The prob-
lem is that something may be a functional kind, and yet have mini-
mal or even no actual capacity to perform its characteristic 
function. Take, for instance, a "printer driver." A computer pro-
gram is a printer driver if and only if it drives the printer. This is a 
nearly pure functional kind because it comprises a variety of 
software and can be instantiated in a variety of hardware. But what 
of a driver that has a bug and thus fails to drive anything? Does it 
cease being a printer driver? No, for we know it was designed for 
its function and, if fixed, still may perform it. Functional kinds need 
have only something like the capacity, when functioning normally, 
to perform their functions. So even if the ideal type of law is a 
valuable functional kind, this does not guarantee that every legal 
system will have some positive worth. 
In the Postscript, Hart adds a third and final step to his argu-
ment. He denies that law is a functional kind at all. In response to 
Dworkin's claim that the function of law is to license the use of 
coercive power, Hart writes: "I think it quite vain to seek any more 
38. Michael Moore, Law as a Functional Kind, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPO-
RARY EssA YS 221 (R.P. George ed., 1992). 
39. This idea was rediscovered by Alasdair Macintyre. See ALASDAIR MAclNTYRE, AF-
TER VIRTUE 175-89 (1981). 
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specific purpose which law as such serves beyond providing guides 
to human conduct and standards of criticism of such conduct" 
(p. 249). The fact that law has such minimal social functions does 
not establish that law is a functional kind. For that stronger thesis, 
we must also show that the law is distinguished by its functions. 
This cannot be done. First, the only universal functions of legal sys-
tems are trivial abstractions, such as guiding conduct, maintaining 
order, and so on. Second, none of these functions is unique to legal 
systems. So, if law is a functional kind, it is a member of the same 
kind as, say, "custom" or "morality" or "religion." As Kelsen saw, 
all of these systems of norms may have similar ambitions or func-
tions;40 they all may, for instance, prohibit murder. But they can be 
distinguished from each other only by their technique. Law is thus a 
modal kind and not a functional kind at all; it is distinguished by its 
means and not its end. The moral value of law depends primarily 
on the ends to which its means are put, and that is a contingent 
matter. 
Hart's overall message about the relationship between law and 
morality is thus in one way similar to Hannah Arendt's in Eich-
mann in Jerusalem. 41 What made Arendt's book so controversial 
was her claim that some Nazi atrocities were not singular, mon-
strous acts of deeply evil men, but rather the routinized, bureau-
cratic administration of people as if they were things. Seen from 
this point of view, Eichmann was the epitome of law-abidingness. 
What Arendt called the "banality of evil" thus may be seen also as 
the lawfulness of evil. That is what is so shocking - that law may 
be, in a phrase that Fuller derided, "an amoral datum."42 Some 
resist this idea so strongly, and are so intent to preserve the halo 
around the procedural virtues of law, that they are prepared to 
make its denial an item of faith. In his exchange with Hart, Fuller 
said: "I shall have to rest on the assertion of a belief that may seem 
naive, namely, that coherence and goodness have more affinity than 
coherence and evil."43 That is a faith that Hart, like Arendt, could 
not share. 
IV. FACTS, VALUES, AND THEORIES 
Hart's book sought, as he said in, its preface, "to further the un-
derstanding of law, coercion, and morality as different but related 
40. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 20 (A. Wedberg trans., 
1945); cf. KELSEN, supra note 9, at 60-62. 
41. I first realized this on reading Lawrence Douglas's excellent article, The Memory of 
Judgment: The Law, the Holocaust, and Denial, HIST. & MEMORY, Fall-Winter 1996, at 100, 
107-08. 
42. See Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. 
L. REV. 630, 636 (1958). 
43. Id. 
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social phenomena" (p. v). He predicted that lawyers would see his 
work as an exercise in "analytical jurisprudence ... concerned with 
the clarification of the general framework of legal thought rather 
than with the criticism of law or legal policy" (p. v). He also liked 
to think of it as "an essay in descriptive sociology" (p. v). 
In case it seems obvious that that is what a legal theory should 
be, it is worth remembering Dworkin's fundamental disagreement. 
According to Dworkin "[j]urisprudence is the general part of adju-
dication, silent prologue to any decision at law."44 At the opening 
of Law's Empire the chapter title puts the question "What is law?", 
the subtitle asks "Why it Matters," and the first sentence answers: 
"It matters how judges decide cases."45 On this point Dworkin 
never wavers. That legal theory is about adjudication is not a mat-
ter on which he ever had second thoughts. As early as 1965, he 
wrote: "What, in general, is a good reason for a decision by a court 
of law? This is the question of jurisprudence . . . . "46 Hart, the 
antiessentialist, never thought that anything properly could be 
called "the question of jurisprudence." The first chapter of The 
Concept of Law is entitled "Persistent Questions," in the plural, of 
which he identifies three as underlying much of the tradition of ar-
gument about the nature of law: How is law related to coercive 
threats? What does the obligatory force of law amount to, and how 
is it related to moral obligation? What are social rules and in what 
way is law about rules? (pp. 6-13). None of these is the question of 
jurisprudence, and, interestingly, none of them is Dworkin's 
question. 
In the Postscript, Hart aims for a peaceful coexistence: Dwor-
kin's question is certainly an important one, and legal reasoning 
and the theory of adjudication were topics on which Hart came to 
think he should have written more.47 But he insists that there re-
mains a role for what he calls a "general and descriptive" legal the-
ory (pp. 239-40). It is general in that it is not tied to any particular 
legal system or culture, and descriptive "in that it is morally neutral 
and has no justificatory aims" (p. 240). Hart adds that "it does not 
seek to justify or commend on moral or other grounds the forms 
and structures which appear in my general account of law, though a 
clear understanding of these is, I think, an important preliminary to 
any useful moral criticism of law" (p. 240). 
44. DwoRKIN, supra note 21, at 90. 
45. Id. at I. 
46. Ronald Dworkin, Does Law Have a Function? A Comment on the 71vo-Level Theory 
of Decision, 74 YALE L.J. 640, 640 (1965). 
47. For some influential positivist accounts of adjudication and legal reasoning, see espe-
cially, NEIL MAcCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978), and RAZ, supra 
note 33, at 180-209. 
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Is moral neutrality possible in these matters? Here, I think we 
are often hampered by a rather sparse vocabulary. Having aban-
doned a crude distinction between fact and value, it is now com-
monplace for legal theorists to infer that purported statements of 
fact necessarily presuppose or express moral and political positions. 
So while we have rejected what Dworkin calls a "fiat distinction 
between description and evaluation,"48 we sometimes fall into a 
casual identification of the evaluative, the moral, and the political. 
. We should avoid this, first by observing the difference between a 
description and a statement of a fact. A statement of fact may be 
appraised as true or false. A description normally. is not thought of 
as being true or false, but as being helpful or unhelpful, illuminating 
or unilluminating. There is an infinite number of possible descrip-
tions of any object or state of affairs because there are infinit~ly 
many facts about each. A. description of something is thus never a 
statement of all the facts about it; it is a selection of those facts that 
are taken to be for some purposes important, salient, relevant, in-
teresting, and so on.49 This is not to say that a description is an 
appraisal of its object; it is to say that describing is always done 
from the point of view of certain values and in that way expresses 
those values. 
Second, we need to remember that not all" values are moral val-
ues. For example, there are the theoretical values of simplicity, 
consistency, fecundity, and so on.50 There is also a deep evaluative 
substratum to practical thought that begins with reflection about 
what is really most salient about the human condition (e.g., the fact 
that we can reason or feel pain), and what, though true, is marginal 
(e.g., that we are featherless and bipedal). Here begins the realm of 
practical value. 
An illuminating descriptive account of law will, therefore, impli-
cate values in these two ways. We will be inclined to endorse a 
theory that is as simple as its subject matter permits, that is consis-
tent with most of the other views we endorse, and that produces 
interesting new hypotheses about and deeper understandings of law 
and other related phenomena. Furthermore, because law is part of 
human thought and practice, we also will prefer to describe it in an 
anthropocentric way, as it relates to those things we take to be most 
important about ourselves - the way law embodies power rela-
tions that can harm or help people, for instance, rather than its con-
nection to the demand for pulp and paper. In these ways, a general 
legal theory must have evaluative aspects, but this stops well short 
48. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE 148 (1985). 
49. See AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 432-49 (1982). 
50. Waluchow calls these "meta-theoretical-evaluative" considerations. See WALUCHow, 
supra note 27, at 19-30. 
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of the basic features of moral evaluation on any plausible account. 
A moral theory will, of course, strive for some similar theoretical 
virtues, and any humanistic morality that it systematizes will also 
begin from some set of salient facts about the human condition; 
however, the characteristic features of moral judgments - identify-
ing basic goods, expressing approval and disapproval, endorsing 
universal prescriptions, among others - all involve commitments 
well beyond those of description. Thus, while descriptions are not 
value-neutral, they need not be morally fraught either. 
This is all that Hart needs. Provided that one may describe a 
state of affairs without thereby endorsing it, the necessary sort of 
neutrality is preserved. That is how we should understand his claim 
that "[d]escription may still be a description, even when what is de-
scribed is an evaluation" (p. 244). None of the familiar arguments 
about the theory-ladenness of factual statements, or the value-
ladenness of descriptions, undermines this idea. 
Hart's most powerful argument for a general and descriptive 
theory of law, however, is not the soft-positivist one that holds that 
a Dworkinian approach is consistent with his own, but rather the 
potent claim that Dworkin's theory actually requires something 
very like Hart's for its success. Even if we say that moral principles 
are part of the law because they are entailed by the theory that best 
fits and justifies the legal institutions as a whole, we still need some 
way to fix on the relevant institutions in the first place. We can 
interpret only an object that we can identify. For this reason, 
Dworkin allows that there must be something called "preinterpre-
tive" law: 
[T]here must be a "preinterpretive" stage in which the rules and stan-
dards taken to provide the tentative content are identified .... I en-
close "preinterpretive" in quotes because some kind of interpretation 
is necessary even at this stage. Social rules do not carry identifying 
labels. But a very great degree of consensus is needed - perhaps an 
interpretive community is usefully defined as requiring consensus at 
this stage - and we may therefore abstract from this stage in our 
analysis by presupposing that the classifications it yields are treated as 
given in day-to-day reflection and argument.51 
Such preinterpretive agreement is, of course, contingent, local, and 
open to challenge and change. There must be, however, "enough 
initial agreement about what practices are legal practices."52 Fortu-
nately, there is; the boundaries are clear to any lawyer who knows 
the craft. Dworkin just insists that lawyers do not learn them by 
first sharing a view about what a legal system amounts to, or even 
51. DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 65-66. 
52. Id. 
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sharing "common criteria or ground rules" for knowing which facts 
about the world are legally relevant.53 
These ideas need clarification, for the assertions that there are 
boundaries but no shared criteria, social rules but no ground rules, 
are obscure. If the point is merely, as Dworkin says, that neither 
lay nor professional understandings of law result from having a 
good theory in pocket, then there is no dispute. Everyone admits 
that the theories arrive late, but what Hart and most other writers 
assert, and what Dworkin here seems to deny, is that interesting 
things may be said about "preinterpretive" law, about the very 
boundaries of legal practice. Dworkin talks of the "consensus," 
"paradigms," and "assumptions" that form preinterpretive law in a 
way that suggests that he takes such nodal points of agreement to 
be surd, unstructured, facts. Hart, in contrast, thinks they are struc-
tured and constructed by conventional social rules. Even if Hart is 
wrong about the character of these rules, I think it premature to 
conclude that there is no work for theory to do at this level. Can it 
really be that a consensus of judgment defies explanation? I am 
inclined to say no. 
It is, however, a fair question to ask, as students will: "What is 
the use of such a theory at such a level of generality?" It is no 
response to say: "Well, law is interesting, and we might as well have 
a general theory about it." We do need to explain why these deep-
est, structural questions about our institutions are interesting and 
important. Dworkin's answer, that it matters how judges decide 
cases, will not help at this level, for little in a general theory of law 
tells us how to decide cases. Nor should we, I think, try to hitch the 
study to some argument about the value of communing with the 
Great Books of legal theory. If a general theory of law is of no real 
use, then we might well question the greatness of these books and 
direct students to any of the competing bibliographies: Bronte is 
always a better read than Bentham. In any case, piety about books 
was not Hart's style. 
He argued with his predecessors, but refused to encumber the 
text with citations. He relegated some modest number of refer-
ences to the back of the book with instructions that they be read, if 
at all, later. (The book would now fail as a tenure piece.) In the 
preface, a little diffidently, he justified this decision by referring to 
his pedagogical aim: 
I hope that this arrangement may discourage the belief that a book on 
legal theory is primarily a book from which one learns what other 
books contain. So long as this belief is held by those who write, little 
progress will be made in the subject; and so long as it is held by those' 
53. See id. at 91. 
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who read, the educational value of the subject must remain very 
small. [p. vi] 
Legal theory has a number of legitimate ambitions, and no one 
need pursue all of them simultaneously, or even at all. I am sure 
that the division of labor is part of what has provoked misunder-
standing of Hart's views. Another part is the way this division plays 
out in the structure of legal education at least in North America. If 
you come to law school with political curiosity but no prior training 
in the humanities or social sciences, and are then fed the typical 
first-year diet of doctrine, you are bound to arrive at your first legal 
theory course aching with hunger. To long for a first chance to de-
bate liberty, justice, or equality and then to be served up the prac-
tice theory of rules must be pretty frustrating. All the talk about 
general theory being the necessary preliminary to evaluation may 
just sound like more excuse for delay. 
There is some justice in this reaction, for description is not ex-
actly a preliminary to evaluation. That view is influenced too much 
by the old idea of philosophy as underlaborer, clearing away the 
muddles .. Description and evaluation intertwine and, ideally, coop-
erate. Consider Hart's advocacy of a wide concept of law, one in-
cluding as full-blooded laws those that are immoral. This is not, he 
insists, a matter of semantics; we should prefer one concept to the 
other only on grounds of theoretical fecundity or of usefulness in 
practical judgements (p. 209). But what he says about theoretical 
fecundity is brief and question-begging. He thinks it confusing to 
separate out iniquitous laws from the rest as "non-laws" because 
they have so much structurally in common with laws, and because 
no other discipline - such as legal history - has found it profita-
ble to distinguish them so (pp. 209-10). This argument, however, 
clearly assumes that the structural features of law are the most cen-
tral, and that is what is at issue. Nor can we say the broad concept 
is strictly necessary for clear practical deliberation. It is true that 
matters of political obligation, punishment, and the rule of law raise 
complex moral issues. If the rule of law is to be sacrificed in order 
that very great evil be punished, then so be it, is Hart's response.s4 
The idea that we may face a choice of evils, however, can be pre-
served in other ways too. For example, one might say that there is 
always a prirna facie moral obligation to obey the law, and also a 
prirna facie moral obligation to do justice. The only sure route from 
the premise "This is the law" to the conclusion "This must be 
54. 
A case of retroactive punishment should not be made to look like an ordinary case of 
punishment for an act illegal at the time. At least it can be claimed for the simple posi-
tivist doctrine that morally iniquitous rules may still be law, that this offers no disguise 
for the choice between evils which, in extreme circumstances, may have to be made. 
Pp. 211-12. 
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obeyed" is one that recognizes no countervailing considerations or 
that holds that the obligation to obey is absolute, but those are not 
errors inherent to a narrow concept of law. So I don't think that we 
are going to justify a general theory of law as a sufficient prophylac-
tic to moral and political obtuseness. 
The main interest in a general theory of law, I think, rests in the 
way that it helps us understand our institutions and, through them, 
our culture. It is only when we move beyond the question of how 
to decide cases, and even beyond the casuistry of applied ethics, 
that we begin to appreciate the role of a general theory. What is 
law that people take such pride in it? Is law a good idea? How and 
to whom do legal institutions distribute power? Is the rule of law 
always desirable? Can it help achieve justice? What might we gain, 
or lose, by limiting the reach of law? Those are deep and urgent 
questions for political theory, and also for political practice. Any-
one who wants answers to them will need the help of a general 
theory of law. That Hart made such a good start on it is, for us, 
extremely lucky. 
